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This article shows that Medical Innovation—the landmark study
by Coleman, Katz, and Menzel—and several subsequent studies
analyzing the diffusion of the drug tetracycline have confounded
social contagion with marketing effects. The article describes the
medical community’s understanding of tetracycline and how the
drug was marketed. This situational analysis finds no reasons to
expect social contagion; instead, aggressive marketing efforts may
have played an important role. The Medical Innovation data set is
reanalyzed and supplemented with newly collected advertising data.
When marketing efforts are controlled for, contagion effects dis-
appear. The article underscores the importance of controlling for
potential confounds when studying the role of social contagion in
innovation diffusion.
INTRODUCTION
Researchers from various disciplines have long studied how innovations
diffuse through populations of individuals, households, and organizations.
1 We benefited from comments by Wayne Baker, Hans Baumgartner, Albert Bemmaor,
the late Clifford Clogg, Jehoshua Eliashberg, Elihu Katz, David Krackhardt, Keith
Ord, Arvind Rangaswamy, David Schmittlein, David Strang, Thomas Valente, Susan
Watkins, the AJS reviewers, and audience members at the 1999 INSNA Sunbelt Con-
ference, the 1994 and 1998 INFORMS Marketing Science Conferences, the Australian
Graduate School of Management, Carnegie Mellon University, Columbia University,
Cornell University, Duke University, Harvard University, Catholic University of Leu-
ven, University of Michigan, Northwestern University, Pennsylvania State University,
Stanford University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Texas
at Austin, and the Wharton School. We thank Thomas Valente for providing us with
the Medical Innovation data set prepared by Ronald Burt. Financial support from
Penn State’s Institute for the Study of Business Markets and the Richard D. Irwin
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Sociologists have offered the important insight that innovation diffusion
may be driven by social contagion—another way of saying that actors’
adoption behavior is a function of their exposure to other actors’ knowl-
edge, attitude, or behavior concerning the innovation. Researchers have
offered different theoretical accounts of social contagion, each describing
a different causal mechanism of social influence.
Information transfer.—The social influence process may simply consist
of information transfer. Actors may become aware of the existence of the
innovation through word of mouth from previous adopters (Katz and
Lazarsfeld 1955). Actors may also update their beliefs about the costs and
benefits of adopting the innovation after discussing it with previous adopt-
ers or after observing the outcomes of adoption (e.g., increased status or
profits). Bayesian updating through social learning under risk aversion
(e.g., Chatterjee and Eliashberg 1990; Roberts and Urban1988) and Ban-
dura’s (1986) vicarious learning and modeling concepts are examples of
this influence process, as is the modeling process posited by DiMaggio
and Powell (1983).
Normative pressures.—The social influence process may take the form
of normative pressures, such as when actors experience dissonance and
hence discomfort when peers whose approval they value have adopted
an innovation, but they have not (e.g., Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 1966;
Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw 1989; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
Competitive concern.—Social contagion may also be driven by the com-
petitive concern that one’s rivals who have adopted the innovation might
be able to gain a competitive edge unless one adopts as well (e.g., Burt
1987; Hannan and McDowell 1987).
Performance network effect.—Some innovations exhibit a performance
network effect when the benefits of use, and hence of adoption, increase
with the number of prior adoptions. This effect may be direct, as with
point-to-point communication devices like telephones and fax machines,
but it may also be indirect, operating through the increased supply of
complementary products, as with videocassette recorders and prerecorded
tapes (Katz and Shapiro 1994), or through the increased supply of sup-
porting infrastructure, such as video rental stores (Brown 1981; Delacroix
and Rao 1994).2
Although these social contagion mechanisms are conceptually distinct,
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Direct correspondence to Christophe Van den
Bulte, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania 19104-6371. E-mail: vdbulte@wharton.upenn.edu
2 Some may prefer to label such indirect endogenous feedback mediated through sup-
pliers’ decisions “ecological influence” rather than “social contagion” to distinguish it
from more direct interpersonal or interorganizational influence (Marsden and Friedkin
1994).
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their expressions in data may often be indistinguishable, making it im-
possible to identify the exact nature of the mechanism at work (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983; Montgomery and Casterline 1996). In this article, we
emphasize and empirically illustrate another fundamental challenge in the
study of social contagion in innovation diffusion processes: how social
network effects may be confounded with common contextual effects.
The danger of confounding common contextual effects for social con-
tagion has long been recognized (e.g., Collier and Messick 1975; Erbring
and Young 1979; Taibleson 1974). Classic studies by Katz and Lazarsfeld
(1955) and Coleman et al. (1966), for instance, documented that awareness
of and attitude toward new products can be affected not only by social
contagion but also by mass media exposure and by companies’ marketing
efforts. More recent research has further challenged the empirical support
for the role of social contagion in innovation diffusion by showing that
S-shaped diffusion curves—often interpreted as evidence of social con-
tagion—can result from population heterogeneity rather than contagion
(Bemmaor 1994; Bonus 1973; Thirtle and Ruttan 1987). For instance,
when a product’s price decreases linearly over time and reservation prices
are normally distributed over the population, the diffusion curve will be
the normal cumulative density function. These results support concerns
voiced by England (1998) and Haunschild and Miner (1997) that the
positive relationship between the prevalence of prior adoption among
one’s network alters and the likelihood of one’s own adoption—typically
interpreted as evidence of social contagion—is often produced by factors
that grow over time but that are excluded from the model.3
This article provides additional support for such concerns about con-
founding social contagion with the effect of omitted contextual variables.
We show that prior evidence of social contagion gained from the Medical
Innovation study by Coleman et al. (1966) is an artifact arising from
omitting the effect of marketing efforts.4 Medical Innovation is a study
on the role of social networks in the diffusion of the broad-spectrum
3 Granovetter (1978) warned of cases in which individuals appear to react to one
another when they are actually responding to a common, external influence. In support,
he provided this memorable quote from Weber ([1921] 1968, p. 23): “Thus, if at the
beginning of a shower a number of people on the street put up their umbrellas at the
same time, this would not ordinarily be a case of action mutually oriented to that of
each other, but rather of all reacting in the same way to the like need of protection
from the rain.”
4 In this article, we use the term “marketing efforts” to denote the range of activities
that a supplier engages in to further the sales of its product. Apart from developing
appealing products, marketing efforts include impersonal marketing communication
(advertising and direct mail), personal selling (termed “detailing” in the pharmaceutical
industry), obtaining free publicity, and managing pricing and distribution (e.g., Bagozzi
1986; van Waterschoot and Van den Bulte 1992).
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antibiotic tetracycline among physicians in four communities in the Amer-
ican Midwest during the mid-1950s. It is often credited with documenting
innovation diffusion as a social process in which adoption is driven by
social contagion (Rogers 1995). The study has more than just historical
interest, though. Its data on the diffusion of tetracycline have become “a
strategic research site for testing new propositions of how social structure
drives contagion” (Burt 1987, p. 1301) and for assessing the performance
of new modeling techniques (Marsden and Podolny 1990; Strang and
Tuma 1993; Valente 1996). While recent reanalyses of the data have found
social contagion effects to be rather small (Burt 1987; Burt and Janicik
1996), sensitive to model specification (Strang and Tuma 1993), or even
insignificant (Marsden and Podolny 1990), these reanalyses were primarily
designed to investigate which social contagion mechanism was operating
(information sharing among cohesive actors vs. competitive mimesis
among positionally equivalent actors) or to assess the performance of new
models in capturing contagion patterns in the data. With such objectives,
previous reanalyses assumed that contagion was truly at work. Therefore,
none started with a detailed account of how the market for the new drug
operated nor included variables capturing time-dependent nonnetwork
mechanisms.
We present our argument in two steps. We first describe the medical
community’s understanding of antibiotics and sources of drug information
at the time the data were originally collected. From this description, we
conclude that social contagion is unlikely to have been a key driver in
physicians’ decision to adopt, but that the pharmaceutical companies’
marketing efforts may have played a considerable role. Next, we test this
conjecture empirically by applying hazard models to the Medical Inno-
vation data set, which we have supplemented with new data on adver-
tising. Our results indicate that previous evidence of social contagion was
spurious. Given the significance of Medical Innovation in the diffusion
literature, our findings underscore the risk of confounds in research on
social contagion in innovation diffusion.
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF TETRACYCLINE AND THE MEDICAL
COMMUNITY
Medical Innovation is a study of the adoption of tetracycline, a broad-
spectrum antibiotic, by 125 physicians in four small cities in Illinois. At
the time that Lederle launched the first tetracycline-based product in
November 1953, three other broad-spectrum antibiotics were already on
the market. Lederle had introduced chlortetracycline in 1948, Parke-Davis
had introduced chloramphenicol in 1949, and Pfizer had introduced oxy-
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tetracycline in 1950. To better understand the situation physicians found
themselves in when deciding whether or not to adopt the new drug, we
analyze the product’s characteristics, the way it was commercialized, and
the kind of sources of information and influence physicians in the 1950s
typically used.
Product Characteristics
The diffusion literature suggests that an innovation’s rate of adoption is
affected by potential adopters’ perceptions of five critical characteristics:
complexity, compatibility with existing values, trialability, observability
of results, and relative advantage over alternatives (Rogers 1995). Tet-
racycline had product characteristics typically associated with rapid
diffusion.
Low complexity.—Tetracycline was chemically similar to two existing
and successful antibiotics, as evidenced by their generic names. Though
a new compound, tetracycline “was merely the newest in an already es-
tablished family of drugs,” and an “undramatic pharmaceutical innova-
tion” (Coleman et al. 1966, pp. 17, 36).
Compatibility.—Physicians were favorably disposed toward the phar-
maceutical industry, its new products, and efforts to market them (Ben
Gaffin 1959; Caplow and Raymond 1954). Enthusiasm was particularly
strong for antibiotics (Peterson et al. 1956).5
Trialability and observability of results.—Broad-spectrum antibiotics
were generally used in the treatment of acute, rather than chronic,
conditions. Because of the short time between treatment and outcome, a
physician could easily and quickly determine drug efficacy in any
particular case and adjust the therapy if necessary (Coleman et al. 1966,
p. 17).
Relative advantage.—Tetracycline produced fewer side effects than the
other three broad-spectrum antibiotics (Pearson 1969). Tolerance and side
effects had become a very important issue by the time tetracycline was
launched. In the summer of 1952, the side effects of chloramphenicol,
5 Peterson et al. (1956) intensively studied 88 general practitioners in North Carolina,
each over a period of three to three-and-a-half days. They often observed the physicians
immediately prepare an injection of penicillin upon learning that the patient had a
fever. This decision was frequently reached before the patient had been examined.
Two-thirds of the physicians gave antibiotics to all patients suffering from respiratory
infections without attempting to determine whether the infection was viral or bacterial
(antibiotics are ineffective against viral infections). Also, “it was apparent from ob-
servation and statements from physicians that their practices in regard to medications
and therapy are influenced significantly by the information and products supplied by
the drug salesman” (p. 103).
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marketed under the brand name Chloromycetin, received wide press cov-
erage. A June 28 editorial of the Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation (JAMA) called doctors’ attention to reports on Chloromycetin’s
side effects, and on July 3 the American Medical Association issued a
press release—“AMA Warns Doctors on Chloromycetin Therapy”—that
received wide coverage in the popular press. Finally, the FDA even with-
drew the drug’s certificate, organized its own field survey, and turned its
reports over to the National Research Council for review. On August 14,
the drug was allowed back on the market, although Parke-Davis was
ordered to print prominently on its labels the dangers inherent in its use
(Fortune 1953; Pearson 1969). As a result of these problems, Chloromy-
cetin’s share of the broad-spectrum antibiotics market declined to 5% in
October 1952, down from 38% four months earlier. In September 1953,
two months before Lederle’s launch of tetracycline, Chloromycetin’s share
was still at only 10% (Fortune 1953). Thus, tetracycline had a competitive
advantage on a product dimension that was especially salient at the time
of its launch.
In sum, tetracycline’s characteristics present strong reasons to expect
rapid diffusion. Also, there is little reason to expect social contagion to
have been important. Since there was little ambiguity or perceived risk
in prescribing tetracycline, information from previous adopters should not
have affected physicians’ evaluation of the drug in a major way. Since
tetracycline was merely the newest member of an already established
family of drugs and an undramatic innovation, it is also questionable that
adopting it would have markedly enhanced physicians’ status among their
peers.
Commercial Context
An analysis of the potential adopter’s situation should also include a view
of the supply side. In this section, we document characteristics that have
been found to be associated with rapid diffusion (e.g., Bauer 1961; Hahn
et al. 1994): the intensity of competition among suppliers, the reputation
of suppliers among potential adopters, and the marketing efforts of
suppliers.
In contrast to other broad-spectrum antibiotics, tetracycline did not
enjoy exclusive patent protection. After a tumultuous episode of litigation,
the parties involved worked out a complex patent sharing and licensing
agreement, giving Lederle, Pfizer, and Bristol the right to manufacture
and sell the drug and allowing Squibb and Upjohn to sell the drug under
a supply contract with Bristol (FTC 1958, pp. 245–57). These five firms
accounted for more than half of all the antibiotics sold in the United
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States in 1950, and all had a good reputation within the medical com-
munity (FTC 1958).
Lederle, the first company to launch a tetracycline formulation, de-
ployed a very aggressive marketing program for its tetracycline brand
Achromycin. Coleman et al. (1966, pp. 44, 181) mention the “blanket
exposure of all doctors to the detail man [i.e., pharmaceutical represen-
tative visiting physicians].” Lederle’s direct mail budget for tetracycline
permitted 105 mailings, an average of two per week, to every physician
in the United States during its first year of commercialization. Medical
journal advertising for the first 12 months consisted of 26 insertions in
JAMA and monthly insertions in the highly circulated Modern Medicine
and Medical Economics, as well as in all state journals, 116 county jour-
nals, and most specialty journals (FTC 1958). Tetracycline also received
wide positive coverage in the professional media (Ben Gaffin and Asso-
ciates [1956] 1961b). As a detail man remarked, “Lederle was interested
in bombarding physicians with the Achromycin name and we did just
that and got the name across. We swamped them with Achromycin” (FTC
1958, p. 130). Pfizer was much less aggressive in pushing tetracycline,
fearing that strongly promoting its own brand of tetracycline, Tetracyn,
would undercut its sales of oxytetracycline. Only in January 1955, possibly
alarmed by the tremendous success of Lederle’s Achromycin, did Pfizer
start to market Tetracyn more aggressively (Mines 1978). We have no
detailed information on how aggressive the other three players marketed
their own tetracycline brand. They did not face the same fear of product
cannibalization as Pfizer did, and they appear to have been more ag-
gressive than Pfizer, though they lacked the resources to be as aggressive
as Lederle (Pearson 1969).
Tetracycline was not only extensively promoted, but also aggressively
priced. Although the product was superior to other broad-spectrum an-
tibiotics, its price to consumers was the same as that of the three other
types of broad-spectrum antibiotics (FTC 1958). To the extent that phy-
sicians took price into consideration in their prescription behavior, tet-
racycline pricing would have favored rapid adoption.
In sum, tetracycline was marketed by a small group of companies en-
joying a solid reputation. The first company to enter the market, Lederle,
deployed a very intensive marketing campaign. The product also enjoyed
a large amount of free publicity. Although superior in therapeutic effects,
the product did not carry a price premium. Such a market environment
is conducive to rapid initial diffusion (Bauer 1961; Hahn et al. 1994),
irrespective of social influence among physicians.
Exposed to such intensive marketing efforts, physicians did not need
word of mouth from their colleagues to become aware of the product’s
existence and purported benefits. Coleman et al. (1966, pp. 13–14) argued
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that the physicians’ problem was not too little but too much information.
Social contagion, then, need not have operated by creating awareness but
by physicians’ turning to their colleagues as a way to cope with infor-
mation overload. Physicians who already had adopted may then have led
others to evaluate the new drug positively. However, such a simplifying
cognitive strategy is necessary only if actors experience ambiguity or un-
certainty, a condition that appears to have been unlikely. While there was
indeed a deluge of information, it all pointed in the same direction: in
favor of adopting tetracycline.
Physicians’ Sources of Information
A number of studies provide insight into the relative importance of the
physicians’ various sources of information about new drugs around the
time of the tetracycline study. Many of these studies were conducted in
the Midwest or in relatively small cities and can thus be expected to be
representative of the four Illinois towns studied in Medical Innovation.
A 1952 survey of midwestern physicians reported that they found detail
men, direct mail, journal articles, and journal advertising to be much
more important sources of information than their colleagues (Caplow and
Raymond 1954). Menzel and Katz (1955) conducted the pilot study for
Medical Innovation in a New England city of comparable size to the four
cities in the main study. They also found that physicians rated colleagues
as less important than detail men, articles in journals, and direct mail. A
study of the diffusion of Lederle’s Achromycin brand in another small
midwestern city found similar results (Ben Gaffin and Associates 1961b),
as did Ferber and Wales (1958), using a sample of Chicago physicians,
and Winick (1961) in a study of an ethical drug introduced in 1957.
National scale studies by the National Opinion Research Center (Hawkins
1959), Ben Gaffin and Associates (1959), and Harris (1966) reported similar
findings as well. All these studies indicate that physicians in the 1950s
typically did not report peer influence as an important information source
for new pharmaceuticals but noted commercial communication efforts
and medical journals to be more important and more valuable.
Conclusion from the Situational Analysis
Overall, tetracycline’s product characteristics, the way it was marketed,
and the sources of information physicians typically used for adoption
decisions do not paint a case for strong contagion effects. Table 1, recon-
structed from original reports on the Medical Innovation study, shows
that physicians considered colleagues to be a source of information and
influence, but not a very important one.
This content downloaded from 165.123.034.086 on March 19, 2018 14:24:00 PM














Influence First Intermediate Final
Detail men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 38 52 27 5
Journal articles . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 23 6 21 21
Direct mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8 22 16 14
Drug house periodicals . . . 4 5 3 11 21
Colleagues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 20 10 15 28
Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 . . . 3 4 8
All other media . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 3 7 3
* Based on Katz (1961, p. 77). A cross-check against the Medical Innovation network data set prepared
by Burt (1986) indicates that the base for these percentages are the 141 physicians (out of a total of 216
interviewed after the 12 exploratory interviews) whose most recent adoption was tetracycline.
† Based on Coleman et al. (1966, p. 59). Data were available for 87 adopters, who generated 131
mentions of sources intermediate to first and last source. Thus, the base for the percentages in the first
and third column is 87; for those in the middle the base is 131.
One might raise the following questions: If advertising and detailing
were indeed as important as our situational analysis suggests, would Cole-
man et al. not have taken these factors into account? Does the fact that
they did not include these factors in their analysis not reduce the face
validity of our own conclusions? We do not believe so. In appendix A,
we document that the way Medical Innovation came about may have
led its authors away from looking into the effects of detailing and journal
advertising. Appendix A also presents a reminiscence by Coleman indi-
cating that he and his fellow authors may not have been very familiar
with the institutional details of their research site.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS INCORPORATING MARKETING EFFORT
Our description of the medical community’s understanding of tetracycline
and of physicians’ sources of information indicates that marketing efforts
by the drug manufacturers, and especially Lederle, may have been key
drivers of the diffusion process. Earlier analyses, however, have ignored
this factor, and their results may therefore have been based on a confound.
We investigate this possibility empirically below.
Substantive Assumptions
We assume that to adopt, physicians must both be aware of the innovation
and evaluate it positively. Using insights from social network threshold
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modeling, we assume that awareness and utility thresholds may vary as
a function of physician characteristics (Erikson 1998; Granovetter 1978;
Hedstro¨m 1994; Valente 1996). Awareness can be driven by marketing
efforts (such as sales calls by detail men and advertising), free publicity
in medical journals, and exposure to peers who have adopted previously
and with whom one shares information on medical practice. Marketing
efforts, free publicity, and social contagion can also affect evaluation.
We assume that social contagion stems from exposure to alters who
have already adopted and that it operates over personal relationships.
This social influence may take the form of information transfer, making
one aware of the existence of the drug or improving one’s evaluation of
the drug’s therapeutic merits. Social influence may also consist of social
normative pressure: to maintain attitudinal balance, one may feel com-
pelled to adopt once many of one’s direct peers have done so. Our data
will not allow us to distinguish between these two “social cohesion” pro-
cesses, but we will distinguish them from social influence operating as
competitive mimicry of structurally equivalent colleagues who a physician
feels compelled to imitate for fear of losing status in the community (cf.
Burt 1987). Our inability to operationalize uniquely each social contagion
mechanism is not important, as our purpose is not to distinguish between
alternative theories positing each type of process, but rather to distinguish
between social contagion and contextual effects, specifically marketing
efforts measured through advertising volume.
Model Specification
We use discrete-time hazard modeling to relate explanatory variables
to adoption behavior (Allison 1982). Operationalizing social network
exposure through lagged endogenous autocorrelation terms (cf. Hedstro¨m
1994; Strang 1991), we represent the hazard of adoption of physician i at
time t as
′prob(y p 1Fy p 0)p F(a x  bS w y ), (1)i,t i,t-1 it j ij j,t-1
where if i has adopted by time t, and otherwise; F is ay p 1 y p 0i,t i,t
cumulative distribution function; xit is a vector of variables affecting i’s
decision to adopt, irrespective of any influence from colleagues (the vector
includes an intercept, a summer dummy, physician characteristics, and
two advertising variables, which are described below); wij is social ex-
posure of physician i to physician j (described below); a, b are a vector
of parameters and a parameter to be estimated, respectively. Discrete-
time hazard models are appropriate here because several adoptions occur
in each observation period. Van den Bulte and Lilien (1999) show that
these statistical models also have the theoretically attractive property that
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they can be derived from both random utility theory and random social
network threshold models.
Data
Coleman et al. (1966) provide a detailed description of the population,
the sample, and data collection procedures. Burt (1986) placed the portion
of the original data set that we use in the public domain. Since the data
are publicly available, we limit our discussion to the variables we used
or constructed for our own analysis.
Physician characteristics.—We included five covariates to account for
heterogeneity in physicians’ tendency to adopt early. Professional age mea-
sures (on a 1–6 scale) how long ago the physician graduated from medical
school. We included both a linear and a quadratic term to account for a
possible inverse U-shaped relationship between professional age and in-
clination toward adoption: compared to midcareer physicians, older phy-
sicians may be more conservative and very inexperienced physicians more
averse to risk. We mean-centered age to reduce collinearity. We used the
number of journals a physician receives or subscribes to as a measure of
media exposure. Journals included both newsletters sent by pharmaceu-
tical companies and scientific and professional publications. We used the
logarithm to reflect decreasing returns to scale. We expected physicians
having a chief or honorary position in their hospital, captured as a dummy
variable, to be less involved in actual medical practice than were active
or regular staff, and hence more likely to adopt later. We also included
an attitudinal measure, scientific orientation, coded as “1” if the physician
agreed with the statement that it is more important for a physician to
“keep himself informed of new scientific developments [than to] devote
more time to his patients,” and “0” otherwise.
We also estimated models including the number of nominations a phy-
sician received as advisor or as discussant as measures of status. Although
sociometric status figures prominently in the analysis by Coleman and his
associates, it did not contribute significantly to model fit, nor did it change
the coefficients of the contagion variables once we controlled for the num-
ber of journals received. Burt (1987), Marsden and Podolny (1990), and
Strang and Tuma (1993) reported similar findings. It appears that opinion
leaders adopted early as a result of their cosmopolitan perspective and
media habits rather than due to pressure to maintain their status among
their colleagues. We report results only for models excluding sociometric
status variables.
Seasonal effects.—We included a seasonal dummy variable for the sum-
mer months of July and August. We expected fewer adoptions of a new
antibiotic in these two months because the weather is warmer and schools
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are closed, limiting the spread of contagious diseases and in turn the
demand for antibiotics (Cliff et al. 1981).
Advertising volume.—The Medical Innovation data do not contain in-
formation on the amount of marketing effort targeted toward the phy-
sicians whose prescriptions were tracked. We use the number of adver-
tising pages in three leading advertising outlets, Modern Medicine,
Medical Economics, and GP, as our measure of marketing effort. These
three publications were preferred by pharmaceutical advertisers and were
widely read by physicians in the 1950s (Ben Gaffin and Associates [1953]
1961a, 1961b). Our attempts to collect data on the number of ads ap-
pearing in JAMA were unsuccessful, as librarians removed the advertising
supplement before binding the issues for storage.
We distinguish between the marketing efforts by the first entrant, Led-
erle, and those of the later entrants. We do so for two reasons. First, the
first entrant’s marketing efforts are often more effective than those of
later entrants when the latter do not offer an important therapeutic ad-
vantage (Bond and Lean 1977; Hurwitz and Caves 1988; Shankar, Car-
penter, and Krishnamurthi 1998). Second, Lederle had a very large sales
force and was strongly committed to building a dominant position ag-
gressively while other companies were less well endowed and less
aggressive.
We matched the number of advertisements in each issue to the four-
week sampling periods in the data set prepared by Burt (1986). Because
the data are monthly observations and because previous research in the
pharmaceutical industry documents the presence of sizable spillover ef-
fects over time (Berndt et al. 1997; Montgomery and Silk 1972; Rangas-
wamy and Krishnamurthi 1991), we expected marketing communication
effects to span multiple periods. We therefore constructed measures of
depreciation-adjusted stock of marketing effort (Berndt et al. 1997; Kalish
and Lilien 1986; Rizzo 1999). Let mt be the amount of advertising in
month t (in hundreds of pages), and let d be the monthly decay rate
( ). The stock of marketing effort Mt is then defined as0 ≤ d ≤ 1
t
ttM p m  (1-d)M p (1-d) m . (2)t t t1 t
tp0
We constructed one such variable for Lederle and one for all other com-
petitors combined. We assumed that the decay parameter d (to be esti-
mated) was equal across companies.
We have not been able to locate data on the amount of detailing effort
by various companies marketing tetracycline, but we do not believe this
to be a problem. Detailing effort and journal advertising are so highly
correlated in pharmaceutical markets that either variable can be used to
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represent overall marketing effort (Berndt et al. 1997; Gatignon, Weitz,
and Bansal 1990; Lilien, Rao, and Kalish 1981; Rangaswamy and Krish-
namurthi 1991; Rizzo 1999).
We do not include interaction effects between marketing effort and the
number of journals received. While such interactions would normally
provide a sharper test of advertising effects, they would be unlikely to
do so in this case because the journal subscription variable does not
discriminate between exposure to commercial and scientific content. Nor
does it distinguish scientific journals, Lederle’s newsletter, and competi-
tors’ newsletters from one another. We see no reason why a physician
with above-average exposure to the scientific information in medical jour-
nals and company-specific newsletters would have been differentially sen-
sitive to advertising or visits by detail men. Nor do we see a reason why
the effectiveness of Lederle’s advertising would have been boosted among
physicians who received many newsletters or were exposed to many jour-
nal advertisements, not only from Lederle but also from its competitors
having a stake in promoting other broad-spectrum antibiotics. A similar
argument applies for the later entrants. Another reason not to expect a
significant interaction between journal subscriptions and later entrants’
marketing efforts is that the latter’s effectiveness is likely to be low overall
(Bond and Lean 1977; Hurwitz and Caves 1988; Shankar et al. 1998),
resulting in a floor effect precluding the detection of significant interaction
effects.6
Contagion variables.—We define the social influence that physician i
is subject to at time t as a function of whether other physicians have( j)
adopted previously (indicated by ) and how important each physicianyj,t1
j is to i (indicated by the social weight wij). The extent of social network
exposure i is experiencing can then be expressed as a lagged network
autocorrelation variable (e.g., Marsden and Podolny 1990;S w yj ij j,t1
Strang 1991). The actual social contagion, that is, influence on adoption
behavior, is then where b is a parameter to be estimated.bS w y ,j ij j,t1
Coleman et al. (1966) had 228 physicians interviewed. Each physician
was asked to name up to three other physicians with whom he discussed
medical practice, and up to three physicians from whom he sought advice
about medical practice. However, Coleman et al. had prescription data
collected only for general practitioners ( ) and not for specialists.Np 125
There are two approaches to this missing data problem. Burt (1987) and
6 To check these a priori reservations, we performed analyses including interaction
terms between number of journals received and marketing stock of both Lederle and
the other entrants. As expected, the interaction terms were not significant ( ).P 1 0.10
The point estimates and significance test of all the other parameters were strikingly
similar to those reported below in this article. Detailed results of these additional
analyses are not reported here but are available on request from the authors.
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Marsden and Podolny (1990) assumed that the adoption of tetracycline
by specialists affected generalists’ decision to adopt; consequently these
authors imputed adoption dates for specialists (though they only analyzed
the generalists’ adoptions). In contrast, Coleman et al. (1966) and Strang
and Tuma (1993) assumed that generalists did not take specialists’ adop-
tion behavior into account; these authors thus do not consider the latter’s
missing adoption data when constructing the social influence variables.
We used both approaches, as Strang and Tuma (1993) suggested that
different assumptions about the effects of specialists on generalists may
have caused different reanalyses to find evidence of social contagion or
not.
We constructed two types of exposure variables, each assuming a dif-
ferent influence mechanism represented by the wij weights. The direct ties
weights reflect whether i nominated j as an interaction partner for advice
or discussions, such that i might have gained information or experienced
social normative pressure from j. We also constructed weights of structural
equivalence indicating whether i might mimic j out of fear of losing out
in the competition for status. We operationalized structural equivalence
as the proportion of exact matches between two physicians’ set of rela-
tionships with third parties: thus, the more their portfolio of relationships
overlap, the higher the weight they give to one another. Appendix B details
how we constructed the network exposure variables .S w yj ij j,t1
We also used the network exposure variables constructed by Burt
(1986): one captures word of mouth operating over direct ties and one
captures competition for status between structurally equivalent physi-
cians. Burt incorporated specialists’ imputed adoption data in his exposure
variables. He also used different operationalizations of the influence
weights than we did. Because of imputation problems, Burt could not
compute exposure to structurally equivalent colleagues for seven physi-
cians. For one of these seven, Burt was also unable to compute a measure
of social cohesion influence. For these few physicians, we substituted our
measures of influence through structural equivalence and direct ties for
Burt’s missing values.
After constructing the variables, we deleted four physicians, due to
missing covariates. The data set for estimation contains 17 monthly ob-
servations for 121 individuals, 105 of whom had adopted by the last
observation period. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the data,
after excluding postadoption observations irrelevant to explain adoption.
Figure 1 graphs the cumulative proportion of physicians having
adopted in each period ( , assuming perfect social mixing, i.e.,p S w yj ij jt
for all i and j where N is the number of actors) as well as thew p 1/Nij
marketing stock Mt of Lederle and the other entrants. The graph shows
that the cumulative fraction of adopters, a rough proxy for average net-
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. y (adoption indicator) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 .314 0 1 . . .
2. Summer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .084 .278 0 1 .05
3. Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .000 1.706 2.54 2.46 .09 .05
4. Age2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.907 2.561 .21 6.48 .08 .05 .17
5. Journals (log) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.484 .392 .69 2.20 .10 .07 .16 .03
6. Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .268 .443 0 1 .12 .08 .01 .01 .02
7. Chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .098 .298 0 1 .05 .00 .31 .26 .06 .29
8. Direct ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .384 .413 0 1 .01 .25 .15 .18 .05 .14 .17
9. Structural equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . .379 .321 0 1 .01 .25 .13 .14 .22 .16 .05 .75
10. Direct ties (Burt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .334 .321 0 1 .07 .18 .15 .07 .04 .14 .09 .68 .70
11. Structural equivalence (Burt) . . . .451 .419 0 1 .02 .27 .18 .09 .15 .16 .15 .86 .82 .72
12. Advertising by Lederle . . . . . . . . . . .155 .087 0 .24 .05 .30 .13 .12 .17 .19 .05 .68 .80 .69 .75 . . .
13. Advertising by others . . . . . . . . . . . . .191 .224 0 .98 .03 .02 .16 .12 .14 .17 .06 .57 .71 .63 .60 .68
Note.—Items 8 and 9 utilize our data; items 10 and 11 utilize data from Burt (1986).
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Fig. 1.—Adoptions and marketing stock; marketing stock is defined as the depreciation-
adjusted cumulative advertising volume (see eq. [2]).
work exposure, closely tracks Lederle’s marketing stock, hence suggesting
the threat of a confound. Figure 2 graphs the empirical hazard rate, that
is, the number of physicians adopting in period t divided by the number
of physicians not having adopted prior to period t, together with the two
marketing stock variables. The hazard rate increases with Lederle’s mar-
keting stock between periods 2 and 7. As Lederle’s marketing stock flat-
tens, the hazard begins to behave more erratically. It even drops in periods
9 and 10 (July–August 1954), possibly due to the summer effect. The
hazard rate picks ups again between periods 10 and 15, which coincides
with increased marketing efforts by later entrants, but the increase is
irregular and not sustained after period 15. Figure 2 suggests that mar-
keting efforts, especially by Lederle, may have been associated with
adoption.
Estimation and Specification Tests
We used both logit and probit specifications and estimated our models
using maximum likelihood, with one exception. We estimated the mar-
keting effort decay parameter d using a grid search (cf. Berndt et al. 1997)
in a model that did not feature social network exposure variables. A value
of led to the highest model likelihood. Model fit was not verydp 0.25
sensitive to changes in the range between 0.15 and 0.30. In subsequent
analyses of models featuring both marketing effort and social network
exposure, we kept d fixed at 0.25.
We checked for unobserved heterogeneity in both probit and logit mod-
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Fig. 2.—Empirical hazard rate and marketing stock. The broken lines around the em-
pirical hazard rate indicate the SE interval ( ). We computed SEs using a logit hazard/ 1
model. The interval is not symmetric because the logit model is linear in the log odds of
the hazard rate, not in the hazard rate itself.
els. In the probit models, we estimated a normal mixture while allowing
the base hazard to vary freely every three months (cf. Han and Hausman
1990). In the logit models, we used the score tests developed by Hamerle
(1990) and Commenges et al. (1994). None of these tests suggested the
presence of significant unobserved heterogeneity ( ). We presentP 1 0.10
the results for the logit specification only and omit the test statistics for
unobserved heterogeneity.
Results
Table 3 reports the results for each of the four social network exposure
variables: two for exposure through direct ties (both our own and Burt’s
measure) and two for exposure through structural equivalence (again our
own and Burt’s measure). The four first columns (1a–4a) report the logit
coefficients in models without marketing effort. Social contagion is sig-
nificant in all four cases. Exponentiating the social contagion coefficients
reported in table 3 indicates that the odds of adoption by someone with
maximum exposure was two to three times the odds of adoption by some-
one without any social network exposure. Also, the coefficients of all
physician characteristics except for age have the expected sign and are
significant at 90% confidence or higher. Age does not have the expected
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TABLE 3
Empirical Proof That Marketing Effort, Not Social Contagion, Is Associated with Adoption Behavior
Without Marketing Effort With Marketing Effort
1a 2a 3a 4a 1b 2b 3b 4b 5
Common tendencies:
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.48**** 3.69**** 3.82**** 3.78**** 4.46**** 4.31**** 4.14**** 4.14**** 4.42****
Summer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 .63 .65 .69 .77 .82 .76 .80 .79
Intrinsic tendencies:
Professional age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 .14* .12 .13* .13* .14* .13* .13* .13*
Professional age2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .09** .09* .10** .09* .10** .10** .10** .10** .10**
Chief or honorary position . . . .92* .94* .86* 1.02** .95* 1.00** .98** .98** .97**
N of journals (log) . . . . . . . . . . . . .76*** .77*** .91*** .87*** .96**** .90*** .92*** .95*** .95***
Scientific orientation . . . . . . . . . . .97**** .99**** .97**** 1.01**** 1.11**** 1.10**** 1.13**** 1.12**** 1.12****
Social contagion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64* 1.18**** .98*** .81*** .16 0.53 .44 .03
Marketing effort:
Lederle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.61*** 4.10* 6.11*** 5.13** 5.22***
Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 .02 .44 .22 .23
Fit:
 2 log likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619.2 611.5 617.1 615.8 608.0 606.8 607.6 608.2 608.2
Note.—Results are logit coefficients from discrete-time hazard models. Models are defined as follows: 1a, 2a, 1b, and 2b contain direct ties; 3a, 4a, 3b, and 4b contain
structural equivalency; 5 contains no contagion. Models 2a, 2b, 4a, and 4b use Burt’s measure; remaining models use our measure.
* two-sided test.P ! .10,
** P ! .05.
*** P ! .01.
**** P ! .001.
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positive sign, suggesting that younger physicians did not delay adoption.
The summer dummy variable has the expected negative sign, but is not
or is only marginally significant.
The next four columns (1b–4b) report the results for models incorpo-
rating marketing efforts. Adding the marketing variables improves model
fit substantially in all four cases. The coefficients of the physician char-
acteristics barely change, but the social contagion effects are now all
insignificant. As expected from our situational analysis, marketing efforts
by Lederle affect adoption more than peer influence or marketing efforts
by later entrants, neither of which show a significant effect. Finally, a
model with marketing effort but without social network exposure fits
about equally well as models with both types of variables (col. 5). Overall,
the results indicate that Lederle’s marketing efforts, not social contagion,
was the dominant driver increasing physicians’ hazard of adoption over
time.
Discussion of the Statistical Analysis
Though we believe that our description of the physicians’ situation at the
time the data were collected is accurate and that our statistical analysis
supports its predictions, the latter involves both modeling compromises
and data restrictions. First, we limited our analysis to interpersonal in-
fluence associated with others’ past behavior and did not consider others’
contemporaneous or anticipated future actions. By ignoring contempo-
raneous actions, we fail to capture possible joint decision making among
physicians. By ignoring how physicians may have anticipated adoptions
of their peers and how this in turn may have led them to adopt preemp-
tively to maintain their status within their community, we may not have
captured competitive contagion fully. Even though our descriptive anal-
ysis suggests contemporaneous social contagion and prospective behavior
were unlikely to be important for tetracycline, we did not assess these
effects in the statistical analysis. There are both statistical (Besag 1975)
and theoretical problems (Coleman 1990) that need to be resolved before
considering empirically analyzing the effects of contemporaneous and an-
ticipated actions in complex, nonrandom network structures.7
Second, our analysis is constrained by the lack of richness in the data
7 Strang and Tuma (1993) do model contemporaneous contagion. Their estimation
procedure, however, does not account for the interdependence among observations
explicitly present once one allows for contemporaneous contagion. Traditional likeli-
hood functions for binary dependent variable models, which include discrete-time
hazard models used in the present study, do not account for this endogeneity. Including
a contemporaneous network exposure variable, Sj wi,j yjt, would lead to invalid results
(Besag 1975).
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about what gets communicated through the network. We assume that
social interaction informs potential adopters only about others’ adoption,
not their expected or achieved utility, attitudes, or other evaluations. This
is defensible when actors do not discern internal states or outcomes of
others. Sometimes, however, outcomes are actually communicated by
adopters (e.g., satisfaction) or can be observed (e.g., market share gains
or increased fundraising by organizations that implement a new tech-
nology). Researchers having such data available can modify the model
quite easily by substituting the relevant variable (say, qj,t) for the yj,t1
indicator and compute network exposure as Sj wij qj,t.
Third, our hazard models do not distinguish between two important
stages in the adoption process: awareness followed by evaluation that is
itself conditional upon awareness (Rogers 1995). Such separation may help
gain a better understanding of the differential effects of advertising and
social contagion, as the former is believed to operate mainly early in the
decision process and the latter mainly in later stages (Rogers 1995). Mod-
eling the effect of marketing efforts and social contagion without distin-
guishing between awareness and evaluation might produce misleading
results when marketing efforts are quite important in creating awareness
and when social contagion is moderately—though still sizably—important
in persuading actors to adopt the innovation. When both explanatory
variables are forced into a single-stage model, the weaker social contagion
effect may be washed out by the marketing effort, erroneously suggesting
that social contagion was not at work.
These three caveats mean that both our analysis and those that preceded
it may not have been able to identify very subtle social contagion processes
affecting the diffusion of tetracycline. Yet, the caveats apply to our own
analysis as well as earlier ones and hence do not affect the main impli-
cation of our statistical analysis: prior evidence of social contagion in the
Medical Innovation data was based on confounding the contextual effect
of Lederle’s aggressive marketing efforts with social contagion.
Our results about the absence of network effects once one controls for
advertising clearly contradict the received view of strong network effects
in Medical Innovation (Rogers 1995). At the same time, they also explain
the “weak” results obtained by Marsden and Podolny (1990) and Strang
and Tuma (1993). Marsden and Podolny estimated a Cox proportional
hazard model, which is very similar to a discrete-time logit hazard model
with a dummy variable for each time period. These dummies capture all
cross-temporal variation in the mean adoption hazard and leave only
variance within particular time periods to be explained by network ex-
posure. Strang and Tuma incorporate lagged penetration as a covariate,
besides lagged network terms. Lagged penetration assumes that any phy-
sician interacts with any other physician (i.e., a constant wij for all i and
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j), ignoring network structure but capturing the cross-temporal variation
in average network exposure. Similarly, our marketing variables vary over
time but not across physicians. Hence, all three studies show that differ-
ences in adoption across physicians within any particular time period are
not statistically significantly associated with differences in lagged social
network exposure. Our study, however, is the only one to provide an
explanation for this finding grounded in a detailed situational analysis.
CONCLUSION
Based on a situational analysis of the medical community’s understanding
of tetracycline in the mid-1950s and on a new statistical analysis, we
conclude that Medical Innovation (Coleman et al. 1966) and several sub-
sequent studies that analyze the diffusion of tetracycline have confounded
social contagion with marketing effects. Our analysis of the drug’s char-
acteristics, the way it was marketed, and the typical sources of information
within the medical community, suggest that it is unlikely that social con-
tagion processes were important in physicians’ decision to adopt, but that
aggressive marketing efforts by Lederle may have had a significant im-
pact. A new statistical analysis of the Medical Innovation data set, sup-
plemented with newly collected data on advertising volume (a measure
of marketing effort), shows that contagion effects disappear once we con-
trol for marketing effort. Hence, we conclude that the data do not doc-
ument that diffusion was driven by contagion operating over social net-
works and that earlier analyses confounded social contagion with the
effect of marketing effort.
The danger of confounding common contextual effects with social con-
tagion has been repeatedly discussed in the literature. Yet, given the prom-
inence of the original Medical Innovation study and subsequent reana-
lyses of the data (esp. Burt 1987) in the diffusion and social network
literatures, our results are particularly noteworthy: they underscore, more
compellingly than general methodological admonitions, that the danger
of confounds when studying the role of social contagion in innovation
diffusion must not be taken lightly.
APPENDIX A
Medical Innovation’s Silence Does Not Mean Marketing Efforts Were
Irrelevant
The authors of Medical Innovation did not pay much attention to mar-
keting factors in their analysis. This oversight does not reduce the face
validity of the conculsions of our situational analysis: Medical Innova-
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tion’s genesis may have led its authors away from looking into the effects
of detailing and journal advertising, and the authors may not have been
very familiar with all the institutional details of their research site.
The genesis of the original study.—Medical Innovation started off as
an advertising effectiveness study for Pfizer, one of the sponsors of Paul
Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University.
As reported by a former affiliate to the bureau, Pfizer “wanted to find out
whether or not it should continue to advertise a new drug in the Journal
of the American Medical Association” (Glock 1979, p. 27). Typical of the
scholarly entrepreneurship with which Lazarsfeld funded his institute,
this rather humdrum marketing question was converted into a sociological
study of scholarly interest showing very little surface traces of its mer-
cantile origins (Rogers 1994). It is important to note that, in those days,
Pfizer did not place ads in the regular advertising section in JAMA, but
had its own newsletter, Spectrum (that contained both ads and articles),
inserted in each issue of JAMA. This, we believe, explains why the study
includes multiple questions about specific newsletters and about JAMA
but none about regular journal advertising or other medical journals
mentioned by name (the questionnaire is reprinted in Coleman et al. 1966,
pp. 195–205). The genesis of Medical Innovation as a study on the ef-
fectiveness of drug house newsletters redefined into a diffusion study also
explains the rather small amount of attention given to detailing as a source
of influence.
Familiarity with the research setting.—Consider the following 1993
reminiscence by James Coleman of the Medical Innovation project:
I never saw the communities. It [Medical Innovation] was one of those
research projects that happens while you are busy with more important
projects. I designed the research with Herb [Menzel] and Elihu [Katz]. Herb
and Elihu reviewed the literature on medical innovation. A team of inter-
viewers came out to Illinois from the Bureau to talk to the doctors, and
Sidney Spivik searched the prescription records. The questionnaires went
back to Columbia to be keypunched, a set of cards were sent to me for
analysis, and the research report was published in Sociometry [1957]. (As
cited in Burt 1997; square brackets added by Burt)
This recollection indicates that neither Coleman nor his two coauthors
had firsthand knowledge of medical practice in the four Illinois com-
munities. Hence, the fact that Medical Innovation does not emphasize
the role of marketing efforts in the diffusion of tetracycline cannot be
used to infer that those efforts were unimportant.
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Procedures Used to Create Social Influence Weights
Our analysis uses both discussion and advice relationships. Using the
network data of all 228 physicians, we constructed the social weight ma-
trices for each of the four cities separately in a series of steps.
Step 1.—First, we created adjacency matrices with element ifa p 1ij
i mentions j; 0 otherwise. We created two such adjacency matrices for
each city: one for discussion ties and one for advice ties.
Step 2.—Since being discussion partners is a naturally reciprocal re-
lationship, we symmetrized the discussion adjacency matrix (Alba and
Kadushin 1976).
Step 3.—We constructed a pooled adjacency matrix by adding the sym-
metrized discussion matrix and the advice matrix, treating discussion and
advice as indicators of a common underlying variable “interacting with.”
We also performed analyses (not reported here) keeping discussion and
advice separate. This separation did not affect the results.
Step 4.—We constructed two different weight matrices to account for
various network contagion mechanisms. Direct tie matrices are identical
to the adjacency matrices. We computed structural equivalence weights
as the proportion of exact matches between two physicians’ set of rela-
tionships with third parties. A valid match required that the physicians
had at least one common third party, which implies that actors without
any common third party did not put any weight on each other’s actions.
Step 5.— We deleted all rows and columns referring to physicians who
were not among the 125 included in the prescription sample.
Step 6.—We put all diagonals to zero and normalized all rows such
that (1) , and (2) , if and only if for some j, andw p 0 S w p 1 w ( 0ii j ij ij
otherwise. This row normalization implies that physicians areS w p 0j ij
sensitive to the proportion rather than the number of relevant others who
have adopted, and it ensures that each network exposure variable is
bounded between zero and one.
After performing these six steps, actor i’s social network exposure at
time t can be computed as .S w yj ij j,t1
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